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Sibo	  Chen	  School	  of	  Communication	  Simon	  Fraser	  University	  	  Our	  dear	  colleague,	  Scott	  Timcke,	  successfully	  defended	  his	  PHD	  dissertation	  on	  February	  19,	  2015.	  Here	  is	  the	  abstract	  of	  his	  dissertation	  “Luck	  and	  Liberty:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Life	  Chances”:	  	  
Abstract	  
	  In	   the	  wake	  of	   growing	  unrest	   about	   economic	  disparities	   between	   the	   “one	  per	   cent”	   and	  other	  classes	   in	  western	  societies,	   I	  argue	   that	  an	  assessment	  of	   life	  chances	   in	  contemporary	  capitalist	  liberal	   democracies	   has	   assumed	   a	   renewed	   urgency.	   There	   are	  many	   other	   factors	   outside	   of	   a	  person’s	  socioeconomic	  position	  that	  can	  influence	  life	  chances,	  such	  as	  race,	  gender,	  or	  ethnicity,	  in	  addition	  to	  intersections	  with	  place	  of	  birth,	  education	  and	  income,	  so	  that	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  class	  often	  has	  a	  distinctively	  multidimensional	  character.	  Still,	   the	  focus	   in	  this	  dissertation	  is	  di-­‐rected	  at	  higher	  levels	  of	  abstraction	  dealing	  with	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  life	  chances	  as	  a	  feature	  of	   life	   in	   western	   capitalist	   liberal	   democracies—societies	   often	   promoted	   as	   the	   freest	   and	   the	  most	  equitable	  in	  the	  world.	  To	  address	  these	  issues	  I	  develop	  a	  conceptual	  test	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  unfair	  contemporary	  cap-­‐italist	   societies	  happen	   to	  be.	   I	  do	   this	  because	   too	  often	  debates	  about	  unfairness	  and	   inequality	  become	  squabbles	  about	   the	  accuracy	  of	  data	  and	   the	   suitability	  of	   econometric	  models	  but	  miss	  the	  point	  about	  ethics	  and	  exploitation;	  all	  of	  which	  distracts	  from	  reform.	  Developing	  this	  test	  has	  necessitated	  a	  movement	   through	  discussions	  of	   luck	  egalitarianism	   in	   the	  moral	  philosophies	  of	  liberalism	  and	  Marxism	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  much	  of	  what	  a	  person	  seeks	  to	  claim	  as	  their	  own	  is	  radically	   contingent.	   Irrespective	  of	  whether	  economic	   inequalities	   are	   caused	  by	   the	  genetic	   lot-­‐tery	  of	  natural	   talents,	   the	  social	   lottery	  of	  opportunities	   to	  develop	  talents,	  or	   the	  market	   lottery	  where	  a	  person’s	  attributes	  become	  talents	  because	  they	  just	  happen	  to	  be	  in	  demand,	  are	  inherent-­‐ly	  unjust.	  Further,	  examining	  the	  role	  of	  market	  economies	  and	  institutional	  design	  in	  allocating	  life	  chances	  and	  rewards	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  a	  conception	  of	  what	  human	  flourishing	  happens	  to	  be	  and	  how	  it	  can	  likely	  be	  achieved.	  In	  this	  respect,	  I	  offer	  a	  small	  contribution	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  in-­‐equality	  by	  developing	  a	  principle	  of	  justice,	  which	  I	  call	  ‘the	  quality	  of	  prospects.’	  	  To	  support	  the	  aforementioned	  principle,	  I	  distinguish	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  luck:	  hard	  luck	  and	  institutional	  luck.	  I	  take	  hard	  luck	  to	  be	  items	  that	  are	  contingent	  and	  accidental	  as	  determined	  via	  ontological	  naturalism	  and	  qualified	  modal	  realism.	  By	  institutional	  luck	  I	  mean	  entrenched	  struc-­‐tured	  allocations	  of	  life	  chances	  as	  determined	  by	  social	  forces.	  While	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  confuse	  hard	  luck	  with	  institutional	  luck,	  I	  argue	  that	  what	  often	  appears	  simply	  as	  hard	  luck	  has	  an	  institu-­‐tional	  anchorage	  that	  to	  some	  degree	  can	  be	  amenable	  to	  human	  intervention.	  Thus	  any	  adequate	  discussion	  of	  luck	  necessarily	  commits	  one	  to	  consider	  politics.	  	  If	  one	  assumes	  that	  the	  amelioration	  of	  social	   inequality	  requires	  a	  major	  redistribution	  of	   life	  chances,	  my	  argument	  in	  this	  dissertation	  is	  that	  such	  redistribution	  ought	  to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  subtle	  appreciation	  of	  how	  luck	  occurs.	  I	  endorse	  the	  view	  that	  social	  equality	  is	  a	  necessary	  foundational	  component	  to	  an	  adequate	  theory	  of	  justice.	  This	  is	  because	  undue	  inequality	  exacerbates	  a	  general	  condition	  of	  alienation	  thereby	  hindering	  genuine	  human	  flourishing.	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